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Abstract
We propose a simple theory of trade credit and prepayment. A downstream firm
trades off inventory holding costs against lost sales. Lost final sales impose a negative
externality on the upstream firm. We show that allowing the downstream firm to
pay with a delay, an arrangement known as “trade credit,” is precisely the solution
to the problem. Solving a reverse externality accounts for the use of prepayment
for inputs, even in the absence of any risk of default by the downstream firm.
We clarify previously unexplained facts including the universal presence of a zero-
interest component in trade credit terms, and the non-responsiveness of interest
charges to fluctuations in the bank rate as well as market demand. We explain
why trade credit is short term credit and why the level of provision is negatively
related to sales and profit and inventory, but positively related to the profit margin.
Finally, we show that under trade credit, inventory investment is invariant to the
real interest rate for a wide range of parameters, explaining the puzzle posed by
Blinder and Maccini (1991). This implies that standard empirical inventory models
would gain explanatory power by including the subsidy effect of accounts payable.
keywords: Trade credit, prepayment, externality, subsidy, the Burkart-Ellingsen
critique, inventory investment
jel classification: D2, E5
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1 Introduction
Delivery of inputs to a ﬁrm does not always coincide with payment by the ﬁrm. A short
term delay in payments is a widely observed form of interﬁrm credit. Delayed payments,
usually called trade credit, account for about 15% of the assets of U.S. manufacturing
ﬁrms. Its importance is further underlined by the role it plays in transmitting monetary
policy shocks (e.g. see Brechling and Lipsey (1963), Meltzer (1960) and Nilsen (2002)).
Why does a supplier of inputs provide credit at zero interest1 to its customers? We propose
a simple theory of trade credit as a subsidy mitigating a negative externality. A down-
stream ﬁrm trades oﬀ inventory holding costs against lost sales. Lost ﬁnal sales impose a
negative externality on an upstream ﬁrm, which supplies inputs. Bank loans cannot solve
this problem. However, the upstream ﬁrm can induce the downstream ﬁrm to internalize
the externality by allowing delayed payments, which is the correct instrument to subsidize
inventory holding. Our model accounts for the use of delayed payment for inputs (trade
credit) as well as prepayment for inputs, which mitigates a reverse externality.
There is a large literature addressing the question under credit market imperfections (aris-
ing from asymmetric information problems). To clarify our contribution, let us discuss
some aspects of this literature and compare with our approach. A common argument ad-
vanced in justifying trade credit is that the input suppliers are better informed/can better
monitor their customers compared to banks. An interesting recent paper by Burkart and
Ellingsen (2004) reviews this literature concisely and provides a cogent critique. They
question the plausibility of such an advantage since typically banks have a greater exper-
tise in evaluating borrowers. The alternative theory they advance argues that it is the
nature of the trade credit instrument - illiquid inputs - that is important. The commit-
ment value of illiquid inputs ameliorates the vulnerability of liquid funds to misuse.
In this view trade credit is supplied only when it earns a return as high as real investment
at the margin. This ties the trade credit interest rate to be at least as large as the bank
1In most industries in developed economies, trade credit is provided at zero interest. Trade credit is
expensive only when the borrower does not repay early, choosing to forego any discount on the invoice.
Further, as noted by Ng et al. (1999), there is widespread use of net terms which are not costly at all
when repaid within the speciﬁed time period (often 30 days).
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rate. However, Ng et al. (1999) report that 88% ﬁrms in their survey do not change
terms at all when banks change interest rates. Further, to motivate the supply of trade
credit, this literature often calculates the interest rate implicit in any missed discount and
identiﬁes such credit as a high cost loan. If indeed the objective of trade credit providers
were to charge a high interest rate, it would be far simpler to specify a standard loan
contract at a high rate. But such terms are not observed anywhere in the developed
world. Instead, all trade credit has a zero interest period lasting typically 10-60 days2.
For net terms, which are widely observed, trade credit has no cost if paid within 30 days.
Therefore we believe the observed terms require further explanation.
Next, as Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) point out, the papers invoking a monitoring ad-
vantage for the input supplier fail to explain why trade credit is limited only to the value
of inputs. Their theory focuses on the advantage derived from the illiquidity of the trade
credit instrument, automatically tying the credit to the value of inputs. However, since
the illiquidity of inputs is critical, the theory cannot explain the practice of prepayment
which is similar to (reverse) trade credit, but is an advance of liquid cash rather than
illiquid inputs.
One explanation for prepayment, arising in the context of developing countries, is that
it is a response to the presence of default risk and/or the risk of order non-collection.
However, in developed western economies, often large, well established ﬁrms prepay their
suppliers, which cannot be explained by appealing to default risk3.
Therefore it remains a challenge to simultaneously explain (a) both trade credit (input
advances by the upstream ﬁrm) and prepayment (cash advances by the downstream ﬁrm),
(b) why all such advances are limited by the value of inputs, and (c) the reason behind
the observed terms - in particular why they always have a zero-interest component.
In our model a downstream ﬁrm facing stochastic ﬁnal demand can either produce immedi-
2Brennan et al. (1988) note that while the credit oﬀers by captive ﬁnance companies in the auto mobile
industry are accompanied by discounts that eﬀectively raise the interest rate above the quoted rate, the
“substantial increase in market share gained by the auto ﬁnance captives suggests, however, that there
remains a net subsidy in their credit terms.”
3As Ferris (1981) notes, prepayment is observed in construction, shipbuilding, aircraft and parts of
the defense industries. Typically, in such cases, the probability of default or non-collection is zero.
Prepayment is also widely used in the US oil and gas industries.
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ately after each sale, or wait for one or more periods before producing. If the downstream
ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to follow a waiting strategy, it might lose some sales, generat-
ing a negative externality for the upstream ﬁrm. We show that delayed payment (trade
credit) induces the downstream ﬁrm to internalize the negative externality by subsidizing
inventory holding.
This subsidy is limited precisely by the value of inputs that is expected to be held.
Thus our theory is not subject to the Burkart-Ellingsen critique mentioned above. The
theory extends to reverse trade credit - i.e. prepayment. This case arises when the
upstream ﬁrm wants to wait, generating a negative externality for the downstream ﬁrm.
This explains why we simultaneously observe trade credit in some cases of upstream-
downstream trading, and prepayment in others, and why all such advances are limited by
the value of inputs.
Further, the bank rate represents the opportunity cost of inventory holding. Therefore
waiting is optimal when the bank rate is relatively high. Since a high bank rate is one
of the factors that can cause waiting, bank loans cannot solve the problem of negative
externality. The solution must be a lower cost subsidy covering at most the value of inputs
- and trade credit is precisely that instrument4. This clariﬁes the reason for providing
credit at a zero interest rate which is lower than the bank rate, and explains why the zero
interest component is present in every trade credit contract. In contrast to the literature,
this also explains why the trade credit interest rate does not vary with either the bank rate
or market demand ﬂuctuations5. A further implication is that trade credit in our model
is a complement to bank credit. Existing theories based on imperfect credit markets often
imply that such complementarity arises from credit rationing. Our theory, in contrast,
predicts complementarity even under prefect capital markets.
While a zero interest component is universal, trade credit terms do vary across sectors.
The most common terms are “net 30” (the downstream sector must pay within 30 days to
avoid any interest cost). There are also discount terms, typically allowing the downstream
4In our simple model, the discounted stream of trade credit and prepayment can be represented as
total transfers of a fraction of the input price. Clearly, this can also be achieved by reducing or increasing
the price. However, price variation is not an appropriate instrument because it does not target the source
of the problem. The issue is discussed in section 9.
5See Ng et al. (1999).
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ﬁrm to take a 2% discount if paid within 10 days. Our model does not directly address
this issue. However, our informal explanation for the diﬀerent net and discount terms
observed across sectors is that these serve as repayment incentives6, and these incentives
should vary across sectors depending on the pattern of ﬁnal demand and the nature of
inputs. Further, Ng et al. (1999) report that 72.4% of ﬁrms in their sample at least
occasionally allow longstanding customer ﬁrms to take unearned discounts. Such weak
enforcement is consistent with our view of trade credit. We should expect that as part of
ongoing trading relationships, the upstream sector does not always aggressively implement
repayment incentives, especially when a delay results from an observable slump in demand
or other observable frictions.
Our theory emphasizes the role played by inventories, and therefore our results also relate
to the literature on inventories. Blinder and Maccini (1991) point out that contrary to
standard theoretical predictions, inventory investment is insensitive to ﬂuctuations in the
real interest rate. They describe this as an “open, important and troublesome” issue. Our
results oﬀer an explanation for this apparent anomaly. We show that a downstream ﬁrm
holds a higher level of inventories under trade credit compared to a setting without trade
credit, making the level of inventories insensitive to the real interest rate under a wide
range of parameters.
A recent paper by Maccini et al. (2004) oﬀers an explanation to the inventory insensitivity
puzzle based on the claim that ﬁrms care about the long-run level of the interest rate and
not about short run rate ﬂuctuations. Our theory complements their work by clarifying
why ﬁrms might not respond to transitory shocks.
Our results also have implications for the relation between trade credit provision and
the supplier’s margin of proﬁt as well as level of proﬁt, the duration of trade credit and
business cycle eﬀects. We show that the implications are consistent with evidence.
6See also the discussion in section 10.
4
Related Literature
We discussed above the literature exploring trade credit as an antidote to credit market
failures arising out of asymmetric information. Other papers assuming perfect ﬁnancial
markets have highlighted sales as motivation for the upstream ﬁrm’s provision of trade
credit. Our theory takes the latter approach, although our analysis is quite diﬀerent from
other papers in this class. An early contribution by Nadiri (1969) simply assumed that
total sales is an increasing function of upstream credit provision, and derived optimal
trade credit in a simple proﬁt maximization framework. The negative externality we
identify provides a reason for such a relation between sales and trade credit to arise.
Ferris (1981) suggests that ﬁrms utilize trade credit to pool liquidity risk, although, as
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) point out, this does not explain why banks do not perform
the pooling function. Our theory, in contrast, rejects bank loans as a solution. Indeed, a
high bank rate is one of the factors that induce ﬁrms to wait in the ﬁrst place, generating
the negative externality. This provides an explicit reason for delayed payment, which is
a loan at a rate lower than the bank rate (and therefore subsidizes inventory holding), to
be exactly the right instrument to solve the problem.
A further theory (Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979), Brennan et al. (1988)) explains trade
credit as a device for price discrimination. They assume that direct price discrimination
(charging diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent customers) is not possible. However, oﬀering trade
credit at diﬀerent terms enables the upstream ﬁrm to lower the eﬀective price for some
customers. If the seller does not have full information about its clients and must set up a
menu of contracts, incentive compatibility requires trade credit interest rate to be at least
as high as the bank rate (see Brennan et al.). However, as pointed out before, a universal
feature of trade credit in developed countries is that it has a zero interest component,
which is a rate lower than the bank rate. Further, this theory ties trade credit oﬀers to
characteristics of demand facing downstream ﬁrms, and cannot account for the observed
invariance of the interest charge to market demand ﬂuctuations. Our model, in contrast,
accounts for both of these features of trade credit. Finally, price discrimination theory
cannot explain the fact that most ﬁrms, at least occasionally, allow longstanding customer
ﬁrms to take unearned discounts. While this is not an issue our model addresses directly,
weak enforcement for longstanding customers, as explained earlier, is entirely consistent
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with our view of trade credit.
In explaining the role of inventories, Kahn (1992) pointed out that ﬁrms must weigh the
cost of stockouts (in terms of lost sales) against the cost of carrying inventory in making
the optimal production decision. In our model, ﬁrms make precisely such a calculation.
The extra dimension here arises through the upstream-downstream relationship, and the
consequent externalities arising from lost downstream sales. Kahn found evidence of
stockouts in U.S. automobile ﬁrms, while admitting zero inventories are observed only
rarely. Our model suggests this rarity is because trade credit provides the incentive to
hold a higher level of inventories under a wide range of parameters. A proper empirical
inventory speciﬁcation should therefore include a trade credit term. This is particularly
important in view of the critical role inventories play in business cycles. Blinder and
Maccini (1991) note that for the U.S., drop in inventory investment accounts for 87% of
the drop in GNP during the average postwar recession.
An earlier paper by Emery (1987) explored the link between inventories and trade credit.
In the Emery model, an upstream ﬁrm in an industry facing seasonal demand varies
credit terms to divide inventory and ﬁnancing costs between itself and the downstream
ﬁrm. However, as Ng et al. (1999) document, ﬁrms in reality do not vary the credit terms
once they have been determined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
Section 3 derives the optimal strategies of the ﬁrms in the absence of trade credit and
clariﬁes the negative externality generated by the downstream sector. Section 4 then
explains the role of trade credit in ameliorating the externality. Next, section 5 extends
the model by introducing an upstream cost of production. Section 6 relates our results to
evidence. Section 7 analyzes the case of prepayment, and section 8 compares the cases in
which trade credit arises to those in which prepayment results. Section 9 discusses why
the right instrument is trade credit or prepayment and not price variation. Section 10
discusses extensions, and section 11 concludes. Proofs not in the body of the paper are
collected in the appendix.
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2 The Model
There is an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm. The upstream ﬁrm produces an intermedi-
ate good which the downstream ﬁrm uses as input, and converts into a ﬁnal consumption
good.
Timing is important since - given positive interest rates - a longer inventory holding period
implies a higher (opportunity) cost. If a ﬁrm purchases inputs early and then experiences
low sales, it has to hold inventories over a longer period of time, and therefore incurs a
higher cost.
There are an inﬁnite number of periods. Production of 1 unit by either ﬁrm takes exactly
1 period. The structure of timing is as follows.
Period -1 is the set-up period for the upstream ﬁrm. At the start of period -1, the
downstream ﬁrm can place an order for a unit of input. The upstream ﬁrm has the
option of producing 1 unit in period -17. Period 0, which follows, is the set-up period for
the downstream ﬁrm. It can buy the unit of input from the upstream ﬁrm (if the latter
has a unit available) and produce a unit of the ﬁnal good, or choose to wait.
From period 1 onwards, the market is open. At the start of each period, a new customer
(who buys a unit of the ﬁnal good from the downstream ﬁrm) arrives with probability p,
where 0 < p < 1.
The arrival of a new customer in any period t ≥ 1 leads to a successful sale if the
downstream ﬁrm has a unit available in ﬁnished goods inventory. If the ﬁrm has no
inventory (this can happen, for example, if the downstream ﬁrm chooses to wait in period
0 and a customer arrives at the start of period 1), and the customer fails to obtain a unit,
he returns with probability q next period (where 0 < q < 1), and if still not served, does
not return.
The return probability q plays an important role. If q = 0, ﬁrms either produce imme-
diately after each sale, or never produce. If q > 0, this gives ﬁrms a potential reason for
7Note that this period cannot be moved. In other words there is no sense in saying “the upstream
ﬁrm should start production in a period later than -1.” Whenever the upstream ﬁrm produces the ﬁrst
unit, that is period -1.
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waiting till a customer arrives to start production. As we clarify later in the paper, if
either non-production or waiting to produce is optimal for a ﬁrm, a negative externality
and consequent scope for trade credit or prepayment arises.
Let P denote the price charged by the downstream ﬁrm and C denote the price charged by
the upstream ﬁrm, which is also the (constant) marginal cost of the downstream ﬁrm. Let
G denote the (constant) marginal cost of the upstream ﬁrm. We assume that P ≥ C ≥ G.
Let r denote the market rate of interest, and let δ denote the discount factor (δ = 1
(1+r)
),
where 0 < δ ≤ 1.
Benchmark Efficiency
We use the term “eﬃciency” in a limited sense here. We simply require that given
the prices, production should not waste any surplus. Since the cost of production of the
upstream product is G, and the ﬁnal price received is P , and since P ≥ G (by assumption)
eﬃciency requires that both ﬁrms produce immediately after each sale (so that no sale
is ever lost). In other words, eﬃciency requires that all ﬁrms pursue the immediate
production strategy for all p > 0 (i.e. whenever the probability of a customer arriving is
non-zero).
Strategies
We consider two types of strategies for each ﬁrm. A ﬁrm can produce immediately after
a sale, or follow a waiting strategy. The details are as follows.
Downstream ﬁrm: The “immediate production” strategy is as follows.
• Place an order for a unit of input at the beginning of period -1. Subsequently,
produce 1 unit in period 0.
• In any period t > 0,
– if a customer arrives at start of the period, sell and produce again,
– otherwise carry over inventory to the next period.
The “wait-and-see” strategy is as follows.
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• Do not place an order for a unit of input at the beginning of period -1. Do nothing
in period 0.
• In any period t > 0,
– produce only if a new customer arrives at the start of period t and this customer
is not served (i.e. produce in period t > 0 only when there is a strictly positive
probability of a returning customer arriving at the start of period t + 1).
– Otherwise restart period 0 strategy.
This strategy says “produce if (1) a customer arrives and (2) there is no unit in the
inventory.” If these two conditions are met, the arriving customer is not served and might
return next period. Thus the probability of at least one customer arriving next period
is higher. Note that waiting beyond this does not make any sense, as any unsatisﬁed
customer today is, by construction, not around two periods from now. More general
models could include the possibility of a customer returning many times, and then waiting
strategies are more complicated. We have chosen the simplest possible framework in which
waiting makes sense and therefore a scope for trade credit arises.
Upstream ﬁrm: The immediate production strategy for the upstream ﬁrm is as follows:
Produce 1 unit in period -1, and then produce 1 unit after every sale of a unit to the
downstream ﬁrm.
The wait-and-see strategy for the upstream ﬁrm is as follows: If the downstream ﬁrm
places an order to buy a unit in period 0, produce in period -1 and then produce after
each sale. If the downstream ﬁrm waits (does not place an order to buy in period 0), do
not produce in period -1. In any period t > 0, produce a unit only if the downstream ﬁrm
makes a sale at the beginning of period t .
Note that if both ﬁrms follow a wait-and-see strategy, production never gets started, and
payoﬀs are zero for all. Thus there are three non-trivial cases: the case in which both
ﬁrms produce immediately, and two cases in which one of the two ﬁrms wait and the other
produces immediately. In all these cases, the upstream ﬁrm produces in period -1. Thus
for purposes of comparison across cases, we can ignore the cost of production in period
-1 and simply suppose that the upstream ﬁrm starts life in period 0 with an endowment
of 1 unit of output.
9
3 Optimal Strategies and Externality
The upstream cost G does not play a crucial role in making the case for trade credit
(except for the uninteresting case in which the cost is so high that the upstream sector
does not provide trade credit at all). To clarify the case for trade credit in the simplest
possible framework, we assume that the upstream cost
G = 0
throughout this section. This allows us to ignore the upstream participation constraint
and simpliﬁes the exposition. This is then relaxed in section 5, which clariﬁes the addi-
tional upstream participation constraint that arises with a positive cost. This cost is also
crucial in the subsequent section which analyzes the case for prepayment.
3.1 Downstream Optimum
Let V I0 be the value at time 0 under immediate production. Clearly,
V I0 = − C + δ p (P − C) + δ2 p (P − C) + . . . = − C +
δ p (P − C)
1− δ (3.1)
Let V W0 be the payoﬀ under the wait-and-see strategy. The following result derives this
payoﬀ.
Lemma 1 The payoﬀ of the downstream ﬁrm under the wait-and-see strategy is given by
V W0 =
δ p [δP (p + (1− δ)(1− p)q)− C (1− δ(1− p))]
(1− δ)(1− δ + δp(2− q)) . (3.2)
Apart from the payoﬀs from the immediate and wait-and-see strategies, we need to con-
sider the incentive of the downstream ﬁrm to participate in production at all. Clearly,
if the rate of interest is high relative to the return from investment, the optimal choice
is to not invest. The rate of return from investment for the downstream ﬁrm is given
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by (P − C)/C. The following result shows that the rate of interest r must be less than
(P −C)/C for the downstream ﬁrm to choose to invest at all. Note that r < (P −C)/C
implies 1/(1 + r) ≡ δ > C/P . The result also shows that this lower bound for δ is tight
in the sense that for δ above the lower bound, there does exist some values of p and q
such that the downstream ﬁrm chooses to invest (using either the wait-and-see or the
immediate production strategy).
Proposition 1 For any δ ≤ C/P , no investment takes place for any values of p and/or
q. Further, for δ > C/P there exists p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1) such that max{V I0 , V W0 } > 0.
The result shows that δ > C/P is necessary for investment to take place. We assume this
is the case:
Assumption 1 δP > C.
The following result now derives the optimal strategy, shown in ﬁgure 1. Let pD denote
the cutoﬀ below which the downstream ﬁrm does not produce, and let pDic denote the
cutoﬀ above which the downstream incentive to follow the immediate production strategy
is satisﬁed.
Proposition 2 For any given P,C, q and δ satisfying assumption 1, there exist cutoﬀs
pD and p
D
ic where 0 ≤ pD < pDic < 1 such that (a) for any p ≥ pDic , the optimal choice
is immediate production, (b) for pD < p < p
D
ic , wait-and-see is optimal, and (c) for
p ≤ pD no investment is optimal. pD and pDic are given by:
pD = max
{
0,
(1− δ)(C − δ q P )
δ((P − C)− (1− δ) q P )
}
(3.3)
pDic =
(1− δ)C
δ((P − C)− q (δ P − C)) (3.4)
3.2 Upstream Payoffs and Externality
Note that the upstream ﬁrm has a zero cost of production, and therefore does not gain
anything by waiting for one or more periods after a sale and then producing a further
11
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Figure 1: pDic is the cutoﬀ above which the downstream ﬁrm pursues immediate production.
An ineﬃciency arises for p < pDic . The downstream ﬁrm chooses the wait-and-see strategy
for p ∈ [pD , pDic ), and does not invest at all for p < pD . pD and pDic are drawn here for
C/P = 0.5 and q = 0.6.
unit of input. However, since waiting forces the downstream ﬁrm to wait as well, some
sales are lost with positive probability, lowering proﬁt in both sectors. Thus the upstream
ﬁrm always produces immediately after a sale8.
Let U I0 and U
W
0 denote the payoﬀs of the upstream ﬁrm when the downstream ﬁrm chooses
the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively.
Lemma 2 The payoﬀs of the upstream ﬁrm under the downstream strategies of immediate
production and wait-and-see are given by:
U I0 = C +
δ p C
1− δ (3.5)
UW0 =
δp
(1− δ) + δ p (2− q)U
I
0 (3.6)
8Later we introduce a positive upstream cost of production and analyze the upstream incentive to
wait.
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Since the coeﬃcient of U I0 on the right hand side of equation (3.6) is strictly lower than
1, any waiting by the downstream ﬁrm reduces upstream payoﬀ and generates a negative
externality. Thus for p ∈ (pD , pDic ) the downstream form generates a negative externality
for the upstream ﬁrm.
Further, since U I0 > 0 whenever p > 0, the upstream ﬁrm would want the downstream
ﬁrm to invest (and follow the immediate production strategy) for all p > 0. Since no
investment takes place for p < pD , in this region as well the downstream ﬁrm generates
a negative externality.
For p ∈ [pD , pDic ) the extent of externality (here deﬁned as the rate of reduction in up-
stream payoﬀ) is given by
U I0 − UW0
U I0
=
δ p (1− q) + (1− δ)
δ p (2− q) + (1− δ) (3.7)
For p ∈ (0, pD ), no investment takes place (0 upstream payoﬀ), and the externality is
given by 1.
4 Delayed Payment
A trade credit oﬀer is to delay the payment for a fraction τ of the cost inputs till the
next order - which occurs when a customer arrives next and a sale takes place. This is
therefore an inventory subsidy. We show below that such a subsidy solves the problem of
negative externality.
As noted in the introduction, a bank loan can never perform this role. A relatively high
bank rate is one of the factors that increases the cost of inventory holding, and causes
waiting to be optimal for the downstream ﬁrm. Therefore bank loans cannot solve the
problem. The solution must be a lower cost subsidy covering at most the value of inputs -
and we show below that trade credit is precisely that instrument. This clariﬁes the reason
for a credit at a zero interest rate which is lower than the bank rate, and explains why
the zero interest component is present in every trade credit term.
Without any trade credit, the payoﬀ of the downstream ﬁrm from immediate production
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is given by (from (3.1):
V I0 = − C +
δ p (P − C)
1− δ .
Suppose a trade credit of τ C is oﬀered, and assume that the trade credit oﬀer is such that
the downstream ﬁrm chooses to produce immediately. Then the downstream ﬁrm pays
(1 − τ)C to the upstream ﬁrm on delivery of each unit of the input good it purchases.
Thus the ﬁrst period payoﬀ is − (1 − τ)C. In each subsequent period, if there is a sale
made by the downstream ﬁrm, it receives the price P , repays τ C, and incurs a new cost
of production of (1− τ)C. Thus in each period after period 1, the payoﬀ is the same as
before, and given by p (P − C). Thus the payoﬀ under trade credit, denoted by V T0 , is
given by
V T0 = − (1− τ)C +
δ p (P − C)
1− δ = V
I
0 + τ C (4.1)
Thus trade credit for a fraction τ of the price can be represented by a total transfer of τ C
from the upstream ﬁrm to the downstream ﬁrm over and above the payoﬀ from immediate
production, whenever τ is such that under trade credit, the downstream ﬁrm chooses to
produce immediately.
This proves the following result, which is very useful for later calculations.
Proposition 3 Suppose trade credit is oﬀered for a fraction τ of the input cost for every
sale of input over an inﬁnite horizon, and τ is such that the downstream incentive to
produce immediately is restored. Then the trade credit scheme can be represented by a
total transfer of τ C from the upstream ﬁrm to the downstream ﬁrm.
A trade credit oﬀer is feasible if it restores downstream incentive to produce immediately,
and satisﬁes the upstream participation constraint. Using equation (4.1), the downstream
incentive constraint is given by
V T0 = V
I
0 + τ C ≥ max{0, V W0 }. (4.2)
Next, let UT0 denote the upstream payoﬀ under trade credit. Using the proposition above,
UT0 = U
I
0 − τ C. Therefore the upstream participation constraint is given by U I0 − τ C ≥
max{0, UW0 }. From (3.6), UW0 > 0. Thus the upstream participation constraint simpliﬁes
to
U I0 − τ C ≥ UW0 (4.3)
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Figure 2: The payoﬀ under trade credit is the upper envelope of the horizontal axis, V W0 and
V I0 .
Now, the optimal trade credit oﬀer must be such that the downstream ﬁrm gets no rent
beyond max{0, V W0 , V I0 }. Let τ ∗ denote the optimal value of τ and let V T ∗0 denote the
payoﬀ of the downstream ﬁrm under the optimal trade credit oﬀer τ ∗C. Then
V T
∗
0 = max{0, V W0 , V I0 }. (4.4)
This is shown in ﬁgure 2. Without trade credit, the downstream ﬁrm invests and follows
the immediate production strategy for p ≥ pDic , and for p < pDic there is a loss of eﬃciency.
The optimal trade credit oﬀer τ ∗C is feasible, and raises the payoﬀ of the immediate pro-
duction strategy to max{0, V W0 , V I0 }, restoring eﬃciency for p < pDic . Thus full eﬃciency
is achieved. The following result conﬁrms this.
Proposition 4 For any P,C, q and δ satisfying assumption 1, the optimal trade credit
fraction τ ∗ < 1 is given by
τ ∗ =
1
C
(
max{0, V W0 , V I0 } − V I0
)
. (4.5)
Optimal trade credit satisﬁes upstream participation constraint, and attains full eﬃciency.
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5 Costly Upstream Production
Let us now relax the assumption of zero upstream cost and assume that the upstream
ﬁrm has a cost of production G > 0.
Proposition 1 showed that δ must exceed C/P for downstream investment to take place at
all. Now that we have added a cost G for the upstream sector, applying exactly the same
reasoning we can show that for upstream investment to be at all viable, we need δ > G/C.
To allow for this we replace assumption 1 by the following augmented assumption:
Assumption 2 δ > max (C/P,G/C).
The payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm under the downstream strategy of immediate production
is now given by:9
Û I0 = (C −G) +
δ p (C −G)
1− δ (5.1)
The payoﬀ if the downstream ﬁrm waits is now denoted by ÛW0 , and as before given by
(3.6), with U I0 on the right hand side replaced by Û
I
0 . The extent of the externality is
exactly as before.
A trade credit oﬀer is feasible if it satisﬁes the downstream participation constraint given
by (4.2) and the upstream participation constraint, which is now given by
ÛT
∗
0 ≡ Û I0 − τ ∗C ≥ ÛW0 . (5.2)
This now binds at positive levels of p. For any given P,C, q, and δ satisfying assump-
tion 2, suppose the participation-in-trade-credit constraint binds at pUptc. Then upstream
participation requires p ≥ pUptc. Figure 3 shows the constraint. We know that trade
credit is relevant for p < pDic . Therefore the negative externality is now eliminated for
p ∈ [pUptc, pDic ]. The results are qualitatively the same as in the case of G = 0.
9As noted at the end of section 2, without loss of generality we can ignore the cost in period -1 (in
eﬀect assuming that the upstream ﬁrm starts with a unit of endowment in period 0). In period 0, the
upstream ﬁrm sells this endowment and then produces another unit, making the period payoﬀ C − G.
Similarly, in any period t > 0, a unit is produced if a sale is made to the downstream ﬁrm (which happens
if the downstream ﬁrms sells a unit) so that the expected payoﬀ is p (C −G) in each such period. Thus
Û I0 = (C −G) + δ p (C −G) + . . ., which explains the payoﬀ.
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Figure 3: The downstream ﬁrm chooses the wait-and-see strategy for p ∈ [pD , pDic ), and does
not invest at all for p < pD . The upstream participation-in-trade-credit constraint is satisﬁed
for p ≥ pUptc. Trade credit can restore ﬁrst best in the shaded region [pUptc, pDic ). pD and pDic
are drawn here for C/P = 0.5 and q = 0.6. pUptc is drawn for G = 0.3.
However, for G > 0 a new possibility arises. The upstream ﬁrm might now have an incen-
tive to delay production. In this case the upstream ﬁrm imposes a negative externality
on the downstream ﬁrm. A natural transfer that can resolve this problem is prepayment
by the downstream ﬁrm (which is formally similar to negative trade credit, i.e. τ < 0).
We explore this after comparing the predictions of our theory with evidence in the next
section.
6 Relating to Evidence
6.1 Trade Credit and Firm Margin, Profit and Sales
Petersen and Rajan (1997) ﬁnd that trade credit provision increases in the supplier’s
margin. At the same time, ﬁrms that experience a decline in sales oﬀer more trade
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credit. Further, more proﬁtable ﬁrms supply less trade credit. While this might appear
anomalous (and the authors do say they ﬁnd this surprising), so far as higher proﬁts imply
greater turnover, this is precisely the prediction of our model.
Corollary 1 The provision of trade credit is increasing in the supplier’s margin (C −G)
and decreasing in the downstream margin (P − C). Further, the supply of trade credit is
decreasing in p.
As (C −G) rises, the upstream ﬁrm has more to lose from lost sales (higher externality),
and has more of a incentive to give trade credit. As (P − C) rises, the downstream ﬁrm
has more to lose from lost sales, and has less incentive to wait, reducing the need for trade
credit.
For proﬁtable ﬁrms turnover is high (i.e. p is high, so that the downstream ﬁrm gets many
customers resulting in high turnover for the upstream ﬁrm). Whenever p is high enough,
there is no need for trade credit. Therefore more proﬁtable ﬁrms supply less trade credit.
Since p parametrizes sales, this also explains why the ﬁrms suﬀering sales declines oﬀer
more trade credit.
6.2 Inventory Investment
There is plenty of casual evidence that indicates upstream ﬁrms are concerned about the
inventories held by downstream ﬁrms, which is our central thesis. A liberal returns policy
in which the upstream ﬁrm allows downstream ﬁrms to return unsold goods mitigates
downstream risk of holding inventories for too long (see Marvel and Peck (1995)). More
closely related to trade credit is the practice of ﬂoor planning. This most often occurs
when auto manufacturers provide credit to their dealers and is described in Dynan et al.
(2002). They ﬁnd that growth of credit provided by captive ﬁnance subsidiaries track
growth of inventories of its dealers quite closely in monthly data from 1996 to 2000.
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6.2.1 Implication of Trade Credit for Inventory
We deﬁne total inventory as ﬁnal goods inventory plus work-in-progress inventory. The
following derives the levels of inventory investment under immediate production as well
as under the wait-and-see strategy by the downstream ﬁrm.
Proposition 5 Under immediate production by the downstream ﬁrm, the inventory level
is equal to 1 per period. Under the wait-and-see strategy by the downstream ﬁrm, the
average inventory level in each period is given by
I
W
=
δ p
1− δ + δ p (2− q) (1− δ q (1− p )) < 1. (6.1)
The result shows that the average inventory level under wait-and-see is less than that
under immediate production. Further, inventory investment under the latter strategy is
insensitive to the interest rate and level of demand, and suﬀers no loss of sales through
stockouts. The incentive for adopting the immediate production strategy comes from two
sources. For high demand (high p) and/or low interest rate (high δ), the downstream
ﬁrm optimally chooses this strategy. If, on the other hand, p is low and/or if the interest
rate is high (low δ), the optimal strategy is to wait, allowing lost sales through stockouts.
This generates a negative externality for the upstream ﬁrm, which now has an incentive
to allow the downstream ﬁrm to delay payment so that the latter avoids losing sales.
Thus for a large range of parameter values, either through own incentives, or through the
incentives of the upstream ﬁrm transmitted through trade credit, the downstream ﬁrm’s
inventory investment remains insensitive to the rate of interest.
This oﬀers a resolution to the inventory puzzle posed by Blinder and Maccini (1991),
who point out that “the question of why inventory investment seems to be insensitive to
changes in real interest rates remains open, important, and troublesome.” As they note,
ﬁrms avoiding stockouts might provide a good explanation. Our model formalizes and
clariﬁes this idea.
A recent paper by Maccini et al. (2004) oﬀers an explanation based on the claim that
ﬁrms care about the long-run level of the interest rate and not about short run rate ﬂuc-
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tuations. Our theory complements their work by clarifying why ﬁrms might not respond
to transitory shocks.
6.2.2 Implication of Inventory for Trade Credit
Blazenko and Vandezande (2003) show that high margin industries hold higher levels of
ﬁnished goods inventories, consistent with our argument that high margin ﬁrms follow an
immediate production strategy. In our theory, if a downstream ﬁrm pursues the immediate
production strategy, it always has enough ﬁnished goods in inventory to serve any arriving
customer, and the case for trade credit does not arise. Our theory therefore predicts that
high margin ﬁrms hold higher levels of ﬁnished goods inventories, and should receive less
trade credit. This is conﬁrmed by Petersen and Rajan (1997), who ﬁnd that receipt of
trade credit (purchases on account) is negatively related to the ratio of ﬁnished goods
inventory to total inventory.
6.3 Trade Credit Terms
6.3.1 Interest Rate
In most industries in developed economies, trade credit is provided at zero interest. Trade
credit is expensive only when it is not repaid early and the borrower chooses to forego
any early repayment discount. Further, as noted by Ng et al. (1999), there is widespread
use of net terms which do not have any such incentives and are not costly at all when
repaid within the speciﬁed time period (often 30 days).
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) rely on competitive pressure to reduce the trade credit
interest rate to the bank rate. Their model cannot explain the a zero trade credit interest
rate which is below a positive bank rate, observed even under imperfect competition
among suppliers. Also, their model cannot explain why the trade credit interest rate does
not respond to changes in the bank rate. Our theory, in contrast, can account for these
observations. The model focuses on the negative externality generated by the downstream
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ﬁrm when it adopts a waiting strategy. Such waiting is optimal if the opportunity cost of
inventory holding (part of which is the bank rate) is high. Therefore bank loans cannot
help, and the correct instrument is an inventory subsidy. A delayed payment is exactly
the right instrument to provide this subsidy. Therefore our theory emphasizes the transfer
implicit in trade credit and is consistent with a positive rate of interest (i.e. a discount
factor less than 1) along with a zero trade credit interest rate. Since the zero-rate credit
is simply a subsidy, it is either oﬀered or not oﬀered, but when oﬀered, the rate does not
respond to bank rate changes. This also explains why the trade credit interest rate does
not respond to changes in market demand.
6.3.2 Duration
Trade credit is short term credit. Indeed, it is the most important source of short term
funds for US ﬁrms. In our theory, trade credit arises as an optimal response to the negative
externality generated by the downstream ﬁrm when it optimally adopts the wait-and-see
strategy. The source of the problem is the inventory holding cost of the downstream
ﬁrm, and trade credit addresses precisely this problem by subsidizing inventory holding.
Further, for any given unit of input, a subsidy is useful only till the ﬁnal output is sold.
Indeed, this is exactly the duration of trade credit in our model. A new unit of input is
purchased when a unit of output is sold, and at that time trade credit for the previous
unit is settled. The longevity of trade credit is therefore naturally bounded by purchase
of input at one end and sale of ﬁnal good at the other. Thus trade credit is indeed short
term credit in our model, consistent with evidence.
6.4 Business Cycle Effects
Finally, let us consider the prediction of our theory about the relation between trade
credit over the business cycle and size of the ﬁrms that receive credit. We take sales
(parametrized here by p) and margin as proxy for ﬁrm size. Small downstream ﬁrms have
a greater incentive to wait and see and therefore they are more likely to be already (even
before a downturn) receiving trade credit relative to larger ﬁrms.
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A downturn implies a subset of (or all of) the following: The rate of interest r increases
(monetary contraction), so that δ falls. Further, demand falls, i.e. p falls. Finally, P might
fall. All these factors make waiting more attractive relative to immediate production for
the downstream ﬁrm, and expand the scope for improvement through trade credit. For
ﬁrms already receiving trade credit, the downturn implies that a higher level of provision
is needed to restore the incentive to produce immediately, and for large ﬁrms who were
previously producing immediately, waiting might now become more attractive, generating
a scope for trade credit.
While the “demand” for trade credit unambiguously increases after a downturn, to com-
plete the picture we need to consider the eﬀect on the incentive to supply trade credit. A
fall in p and/or δ makes it harder to satisfy the upstream participation constraint. A small
ﬁrm for which p is not very high initially might lose its trade credit if p falls any further.
For large downstream ﬁrms, p is higher, and therefore the upstream ﬁrm has more to lose
if such ﬁrms choose to wait. Moreover, it takes relatively less to provide such ﬁrms with
the incentive to produce immediately. Thus for large ﬁrms, there is more scope for trade
credit expansion after a downturn without hitting the upstream participation constraint.
To put it diﬀerently, the upstream participation constraint implies that in a downturn,
there is less scope of trade credit expansion to existing credit customers relative to new
credit customers (typically ﬁrms that were cash customers who are now oﬀered credit),
and the latter are likely to be larger ﬁrms (who previously did not need trade credit in
order to choose immediate production). This implies that trade credit should be more
countercyclical for large ﬁrms. This is consistent with evidence reported by Nilsen (2002),
who ﬁnds trade credit is more countercyclical for large ﬁrms.
7 Prepayment
We now proceed with the assumption that the downstream ﬁrm chooses to produce im-
mediately (P − C high) and analyze the upstream ﬁrm’s incentive to delay production,
making a case for prepayment. In the next section we relax this assumption and look at
the diﬀerent parametric speciﬁcations that lead to either trade credit or prepayment.
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7.1 Optimal strategy of the upstream firm
Let UUI0 and U
UW
0 denote the payoﬀs of the upstream ﬁrm when the upstream ﬁrm chooses
the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively.
Lemma 3 The payoﬀs are given by:
UUI0 = (C −G) +
δ p (C −G)
1− δ (7.1)
UUW0 =
(
1− δ (1− p) (1 + δ (1− δ) p q)
)
C − δ pG
(1− δ) (1 + δ p (1− δ q (1− p))) . (7.2)
We can now derive the optimal strategy of the upstream ﬁrm. Let pUic denote the cut-
oﬀ above which the upstream incentive to follow the immediate production strategy is
satisﬁed.
Proposition 6 For any given C,G and any δ satisfying assumption 2, there exists a
cutoﬀ pUic ∈ (0, 1) such that for p ≥ pUic, the optimal choice is immediate production, and
for p < pUic, wait-and-see is optimal.
7.2 Downstream Optimum
Let V UI0 and V
UW
0 denote the payoﬀs of the downstream ﬁrm when the upstream ﬁrm
chooses the strategy of immediate production and wait-and-see, respectively. V UI0 is the
same as V I0 given by (3.1). The following result derives V
UW
0 .
Lemma 4
V UW0 = − C +
δ p
(
P − δ C)
(1− δ) (1 + δ p (1− δ q (1− p))) (7.3)
The following derives the downstream optimum.
23
Proposition 7 Whenever the downstream ﬁrm prefers immediate production to waiting
itself, it also prefers the upstream sector to produce immediately rather than wait and see.
Formally, V UI0 > V
UW
0 for p ≥ pDic , where pDic is given by equation (3.4).
The intuition is simple. Waiting by the upstream ﬁrm causes the downstream ﬁrm to lose
some customers. Since it prefers not to wait itself (i.e. prefers to serve all customers),
waiting by the upstream ﬁrm generates a lower payoﬀ compared to immediate production
by the upstream ﬁrm. Thus for p > pDic , the externality is given by
V UI0 − V UW0
V UI0
. (The
expanded algebraic form is too complex to be of much help, so we leave it as this.)
7.3 Prepayment
Suppose the downstream ﬁrm prepays a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the upstream price C in
each period in which it places an order for a unit of input from the upstream ﬁrm. Since
this depends on the arrival of customers, the calculation of payoﬀs under prepayment is
potentially complex. However, the following result shows that any prepayment scheme
that restores the upstream incentive to produce immediately at all times over an inﬁnite
horizon can be represented very simply as a total transfer. This considerably simpliﬁes
the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 8 Suppose prepayment is oﬀered for a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the upstream
price at every instance of placing an order for inputs over an inﬁnite horizon, and θ is
such that the upstream incentive to produce immediately is restored. Then the prepayment
scheme can be represented by a total transfer of θ C from the downstream ﬁrm to the
upstream ﬁrm.
Proof: Without any prepayment, the payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm from immediate pro-
duction is given by (from (7.1)):
UUI0 = (C −G) +
δ p (C −G)
1− δ .
If a prepayment of θ C is made every period, the ﬁrst period payoﬀ is (C −G) + θ C. In
each subsequent period, if there is a sale made by the downstream ﬁrm, the upstream
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ﬁrm also makes a sale to the downstream ﬁrm, and receives the price (1 − θ)C, plus
a prepayment of θ C and incurs a cost of production of G. Thus in each period after
period 1, the payoﬀ is the same as before, and given by p (C−G). Thus the payoﬀ under
prepayment, denoted by UPP0 , is given by
UPP0 = C −G + θ C + δ p (C −G) + δ2 p (C −G) + . . . = θ C + UUI0
Comparing the two payoﬀs above, it is clear that the payoﬀ under prepayment of θ C
per period exceeds the no prepayment payoﬀ by exactly θ C. Thus the prepayment of a
fraction θ of the price can be represented by a total transfer of θ C from the downstream
ﬁrm to the upstream ﬁrm.‖
For prepayment to be optimal, we need UPP0 ≥ UUW0 as well as V PP0 ≥ V UW0 . UPP0 is
given by UUI0 + θC. Whenever U
UW
0 > U
UI
0 , let θ
∗ be such that
UUI0 + θ
∗C = UUW0 .
From equations (7.1) and (7.2), θ∗ is given by
θ∗ =
G
C (1 + δ p)
− δ p (C −G) (1− δ (1− p))
C (1− δ) (1 + δ p) . (7.4)
Since C > G, the ﬁrst term is less than 1. Since the second term is positive, and subtracted
from the ﬁrst term, clearly θ∗ < 1. Therefore the optimal prepayment θ∗C, which restores
upstream incentive to produce immediately, is indeed a fraction of the upstream price C.
Finally, the downstream sector participates in prepayment if the following constraint is
satisﬁed:
V UI0 − θ∗C ≥ V UW0 . (7.5)
The following result characterizes the outcome under prepayment. Let pDpp denote the
cutoﬀ above which the upstream participation-in-prepayment constraint holds.
Proposition 9 There exists pDpp, where p
D
ic ≤ pDpp < 1, such that for p ≥ pDpp the down-
stream participation-in-prepayment constraint (7.5) holds. For any (P,C,G, q) and any δ
satisfying assumption 2, if pDpp < p
U
ic, prepayment restores eﬃciency on [p
D
pp, p
U
ic].
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8 Trade Credit versus Prepayment
The case for prepayment arises when the upstream markup C−G is low. In this case, the
return from production is relatively less attractive compared to the return from waiting
(by waiting one period the ﬁrm can earn at the bank rate). Therefore if C−G is low, the
upstream ﬁrm has a greater incentive to wait, which implies that pUic is larger. Further, a
higher P relaxes the downstream participation-in-prepayment constraint, increasing the
scope for prepayment provision. If, on the other hand, P −C is low, the downstream ﬁrm
has less to lose by waiting, and the case for trade credit arises. Further, a lower G implies
a greater willingness of the upstream ﬁrm to provide trade credit10. In all cases, a lower
δ (higher interest rate), as well as a higher q make waiting relatively more attractive.
We deﬁne the scope of trade credit (prepayment) to be the range of p for which trade
credit (prepayment) can improve eﬃciency.
Proposition 10 (1) The scope for trade credit decreases with P − C, δ and increases
with q. Further, for any (P,C, q), any δ satisfying assumption 2, and any p < pDic , there
exists a cutoﬀ Gc such that for any G < Gc, the upstream participation-in-trade-credit
constraint is satisﬁed.
(2) The scope for prepayment decreases with C −G, δ and increases with q. Further, for
any (P,C, q), any δ satisfying assumption 2, and any p < pUic, there exists a cutoﬀ Pc such
that for any P > Pc, the downstream participation-in-prepayment constraint is satisﬁed.
The result shows that if the downstream margin is low, and if the upstream cost G is not
very high, we are likely to observe trade credit. On the other hand, if the upstream margin
is low, and the downstream price P is not very low, we are likely to observe prepayment.
10Note that while a lower C increases the incentive to make a prepayment, this also reduces the
upstream markup C −G and therefore increases the amount of prepayment required to restore upstream
incentive to produce immediately. Therefore, a lower C does not necessarily increase the incentive to
provide prepayment. Similarly, increasing C need not increase the willingness of the upstream ﬁrm to
provide trade credit. A higher C increases the incentive to provide trade credit, but also reduces the
downstream margin P − C which increases the amount of trade credit required to restore downstream
incentive to produce immediately.
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9 Trade Credit and Prepayment Versus Price Variation
In our simple model, we show that the discounted stream of trade credit as well as
prepayment can be represented as total transfers of a fraction of the input price. Clearly,
this can also be achieved by reducing or increasing the price directly. However, we believe
trade credit is the more appropriate instrument for the following reasons.
First, a price change does not target the right source. The source of the negative exter-
nality is that inventory holding is costly. So the correct instrument is one that subsidizes
this cost, and can change with P , p, q, or r so that the inventory holding incentives re-
main optimal for each unit of input. A lower input price makes the loss of a downstream
ﬁrm from a lost sale greater, and hence could provide the incentive to hold inventory.
However, if the price is low, this also gives incentive to buy even when there is a unit of
ﬁnal good in the inventory - so as to avoid a future price rise (e.g. when it is expected
that r is likely to fall, or p is likely to rise, a lower subsidy - implying a higher price - is
expected in future). To forestall this possibility, the upstream ﬁrm must monitor the use
of any input closely to see which ﬁnal unit it produces and when this is sold, and only
then sell any more input units. This would clearly be unworkable if ﬁnal sales are not
always observable.
In other words, since trade credit is tied to the inputs, its usefulness automatically expires
once the ﬁnal output produced from a unit of input is sold. That is, the trade credit beneﬁt
is speciﬁc to the unit and cannot be passed on to other units. A price reduction, on the
other hand, does not automatically expire once its usefulness in providing incentive to
hold inventory ends. This would happen only if the upstream ﬁrm has full information
about ﬁnal sales, which is unrealistic.
There are other problems with using price variation as an instrument. In our model there
is just one downstream ﬁrm. In reality, there could be several downstream ﬁrms, each
facing a diﬀerent circumstance (for example, one ﬁrm with high ﬁnal demand (high p),
and another with low ﬁnal demand). If the upstream ﬁrm cannot set diﬀerent prices
across customers (as posited by the theories discussed in the introduction that explain
trade credit as a device for price discrimination), this would clearly over-subsidize some
customers and/or under-subsidize others.
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Further, lowering prices could weaken the bargaining power of the upstream ﬁrm making
it diﬃcult to charge a higher price in future. There could also be menu costs associated
with frequent price changes.
In fact, downstream ﬁrms might also prefer trade credit over price changes. Frequent price
changes, and diﬀerent prices across customers make for very non transparent pricing, and
might increase the market power of upstream ﬁrms. Trade credit, on the other hand,
is always a subsidy, and cannot be used as a tool to extract a higher price from the
downstream ﬁrm.
10 Extensions
Multiple Suppliers Our model has one upstream and one downstream ﬁrm. Therefore
it cannot say much about the importance of an exclusive relationship. Doing this would
require a model with multiple suppliers. Here we discuss informally how the analysis
might change under multiple suppliers, and the value of exclusive relationships. Let us
suppose there are two input suppliers, A and B.
With multiple suppliers, trade credit or prepayment become more blunt as instruments.
The problem is that if supplier A provides trade credit, reducing the cost of holding
inventory for inputs supplied by A, the downstream ﬁrm might transfer some of the cost
saving on A inputs to buy more from supplier B. Thus provision of trade credit by a
supplier can generate a positive externality for other suppliers. If this eﬀect is signiﬁcant,
the equilibrium trade credit provision can be low. The same problem applies to the
provision of prepayment. An exclusive relationship allows the provider of trade credit or
prepayment to enjoy all the beneﬁts of the implied subsidy.
A further issue that arises with multiple suppliers is as follows. Trade credit for a unit
of input is useful up to the point a sale is made of the ﬁnal good produced from that
unit of input. If we do not assume full information, then after the sale of a unit by the
downstream ﬁrm, neither A nor B might know whose input was used to produce this
unit. This would make it diﬃcult for the suppliers to determine what the useful period
of trade credit is. This would lead the suppliers to use repayment incentives in the form
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of discounts for early payments, or penalties for late payment.
In this paper, we have explained discount terms informally as repayment incentives. The
discussion above shows that with multiple suppliers, this could be explained formally.
Further, we would expect a supplier to be lenient towards long standing customers, and
not enforce the penalties very strictly, consistent with evidence gathered by Ng et al.
(1999).
Adding a default risk In this paper we set ourselves the challenge of explaining pre-
payment in developed market economies with little or no chance of default. Our explana-
tion is based on the negative externality arising from upstream optimization, a problem
that can be addressed precisely through prepayment, which provides a targeted subsidy.
However, if we do include a default risk (perhaps because of poor enforcement of law),
the scope for prepayment increases, as this now also serves as insurance against default.
This explains the preponderance of prepayment observed in developing countries. In a
survey of 115 micro and small ﬁrms engaged in metal fabrication and light manufacturing
in Nairobi, Vandenberg (2003) ﬁnds that ﬁrms rely heavily on pre-payment, with 87% of
all ﬁrms requiring a down payment on large orders. As the author stresses, in such cases
prepayment serves the twin purposes of ﬁnancing and enforcement (the prepaid money is
lost if the goods are not collected).
11 Conclusion
While theories based on the asymmetric information explain part of the reason for trade
credit (input advance by the upstream ﬁrm), these leave important aspects uncovered.
We take a diﬀerent route and explain trade credit as inventory subsidy. We believe this
motive underlies much of the trade credit exchanged in the economy and has not been
explored so far. Our model can also explain the use of prepayment (cash advance by
the downstream ﬁrm) and clariﬁes previously unexplained facts including the universal
zero interest component in trade credit terms, and the invariance of the interest rate to
ﬂuctuations in the bank rate as well as market demand.
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Our theory explains trade credit (prepayment) as an inventory subsidy helping to internal-
ize a negative externality that arises whenever the downstream (upstream) ﬁrm optimally
chooses not to produce or wait before producing.
An inventory subsidy is limited by the value of inputs that is expected to be held. Thus our
theory is consistent with the fact that the extent of trade credit is determined by the value
of inputs, and not subject to the Burkart-Ellingsen critique. Further, the downstream ﬁrm
sometimes ﬁnds waiting to be optimal because the (opportunity) cost of inventory holding
exceeds the expected loss through sales forgone. Given that a relatively high bank rate is
one of the factors that generate an incentive to wait, bank loans cannot solve the problem.
The solution must be a lower cost subsidy covering at most the value of inputs - and trade
credit is precisely that instrument. This clariﬁes why all trade credit is provided with a
zero interest rate component, necessarily lower than the bank rate. This also shows that in
our theory trade credit is a complement - not substitute - of bank lending. The literature
often implies that such complementarity arises from credit rationing. Our theory, in
contrast, predicts complementarity even under prefect capital markets.
Our theory closely links trade credit to the inventory asset. This is particularly important
because of the empirical failures of the standard inventory models and the role inventories
play in business cycles. Our model predicts that downstream ﬁrms hold a higher average
level of inventories with trade credit than without. This suggests standard inventory
models would perform better if they include trade credit in the speciﬁcation and take
account of the ﬁrms’ relative supply chain positions. Further, our model predicts that
under trade credit, inventory investment is invariant to the real interest rate term for a
wide range of parameters. This provides an explanation of the puzzle of insensitivity of
inventory investment to the real interest rate pointed out by Blinder and Maccini (1991).
In sum, our model emphasizes the motive for trade credit has no intended “credit” purpose
at all - it is a targeted inventory subsidy. The predictions arising from our model are
consistent with a broad array of evidence, and throws new light on several aspects of trade
credit as well as prepayment. Empirical tests of the success of this approach relative to
other theories is on the agenda for future research.
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12 Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
Let V1(1) be the value starting period 1 if a customer arrives at the start of period 1, and
V1(0) be the value starting period 1 no one arrives at the start of period 1. In the latter
case, the situation is exactly as at the start of period 0 and thus V1(0) = V
W
0 . Then
V W0 = 0 + δ
(
(1− p) V W0 + p V1(1)
)
(A.1)
To calculate V1(1), note that once a customer arrives at the start of period 1, there are 3
possible states at the beginning of period 2:
• State 1: Exactly one customer arrives. Probability of this event is (p+q−2p q). The
ﬁrm sells and gets P , and then restarts period 0 strategy. Thus payoﬀ is P + V W0 .
• State 2: 2 customers (1 old and 1 new) arrive. Probability of this event is p q. The
ﬁrm sells to the returning customer and gets P , and then onwards gets V1(1). Thus
payoﬀ is P + V1(1).
• State 3: No one arrives. Probability of this event is (1 − p)(1− q). Let the payoﬀ
in this state be denoted by V2(0). This is given by:
V2(0) = 0 + δ
(
p (P + V W0 ) + (1− p) V2(0)
)
. (A.2)
From the above,
V1(1) = − C + δ
[
(p + q − 2p q)(P + V W0 ) + p q(P + V1(1)) + (1− p)(1− q)V2(0)
]
(A.3)
From equations A.1, A.2 and A.3, we can solve for V W0 , and obtain the stated value.‖
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
From equation (3.2), we can write V W0 as V
W
0 = f(δ)g(δ), where f(δ) =
δp
1− δ , and
g(δ) =
P (p + (1− δ) q (1− p))− C/δ + C (1− p)
D
,
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where D = (1− δ)/δ + p(2− q).
g(C/P ) = −C (P−C) (1−p) (1−q)
(P−C)+p (2−q) C ≤ 0, with strict inequality for p < 1. Thus at δ = C/P ,
V W0 ≤ 0, with strict inequality for p < 1. Further, at δ = C/P , V I0 = −C(1− p) ≤ 0.
Now, f(·) > 0, f ′(·) > 0. Further,
g′(·) = 1
δ2D2
(
p(1− δ2q (2− q) (1− p))P + (1− δ)2q (1− p) P + p (1− q) C) > 0,
where the last step follows from the fact that the maximized value of q(2 − q) is 1, and
therefore 1− δ2q(2− q)(1−p) > 0. Thus ∂VW0
∂δ
> 0 whenever g(δ) > 0. But since f(δ) > 0
always, whenever g(δ) > 0 it is also true that V W0 > 0.
Therefore, if g(δ∗) > 0 for any δ∗ > 0, then g(·) is positive and increasing for all δ > δ∗.
Since for δ = C/P , both V I0 and V
W
0 are non-positive, from the above it follows that
for all δ < C/P they are negative. Thus for any investment to take place, a necessary
condition is δ > C/P .
Finally, let us show that for δ > C/P there exists p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1) such that
max{V I0 , V W0 } > 0.
At p = 1, V W0 is given by
δ
(1−δ)(1+δ(1−q)) (δP − C), which is strictly positive for δ > C/P .
Thus for any δ > C/P , there exists some p < 1 such that V W0 > 0 for p > p. Similarly,
for q = 1, V W0 =
δp
1−δ (δP − C) which is strictly positive for δ > C/P . Thus if δ > C/P ,
there exists some q < 1 such that V W0 > 0 for q > q. This proves for δ > C/P there exists
p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1) such that max{V I0 , V W0 } > 0.‖
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
From equation (3.2), V W0 ≥ 0 implies
p ≥ (1− δ)(C − δqP )
δ((P − C)− (1− δ)qP ) , (A.4)
where strict equality implies V W0 = 0. From equation (3.1), V
I
0 ≥ 0 implies
p ≥ (1− δ)C
δ(P − C) , (A.5)
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where, similarly, strict equality implies V I0 = 0. It can be easily checked that for any
δ ∈ (C/P, 1), the expression on the right hand side of (A.5) strictly exceeds that of (A.4).
Thus the participation constraint for investment is given by p ≥ pD where pD is the
maximum of 0 and the expression on the right hand side of (A.4). This gives us the
expression for pD given by the proposition.
Next, the optimal choice is immediate production if V I0 ≥ V W0 . Solving from equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2), this is the case if p ≥ pDic where pDic is as in equation (3.4).
Finally, we check that pD < p
D
ic < 1. p
D
ic < 1 is true if
(1−δ)C
δ((P−C)−q(δP−C)) < 1, which
simpliﬁes to δq < 1, which is true. Next, since (P−C)−q(δP−C) > (P−C)−(δP−C) =
(1− δ) p > 0, it is clear that pDic > 0. Thus pD < pDic is true if
(1− δ)(C − δqP )
δ((P − C)− (1− δ)qP ) <
(1− δ)C
δ((P − C)− q(δP − C)) ,
which simpliﬁes to
δP 2 + (δP − C)(C − δqP )− CP > 0
which implies
(δP − C)(P (1− δq) + C) > 0
which is true, since δ > C/P .
Thus for p ≥ pDic , immediate production is optimal, for p ∈ (pD , pDic ), the payoﬀ from
waiting is higher than immediate production (V W0 > V
I
0 ), and satisﬁes the participation
constraint (V W0 > 0). Finally, for p ≤ pD , the payoﬀ from investment is negative, and
not investing is optimal.‖
A.4 Proof of lemma 2
If the downstream ﬁrm adopts the immediate production strategy, each period a sale
occurs with probability p. Thus
U I0 = C + δ pC + δ
2 pC + . . . = C +
δ pC
1− δ
If the downstream ﬁrm adopts the wait-and-see strategy, the payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm
can be calculated as follows.
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In what follows, the term “customer” means a customer for the downstream ﬁrm, i.e. a
ﬁnal customer.
Let U1(1) be the value starting period 1 if a customer arrives at the start of period 1, and
U1(0) be the value starting period 1 no arrives at the start of period 1. In the latter case,
the situation is exactly as at the start of period 0 and thus U1(0) = U
W
0 . Then
UW0 = 0 + δ
(
(1− p) UW0 + p U1(1)
)
(A.6)
To calculate U1(1), note that once a customer arrives at the start of period 1, the upstream
ﬁrms sells a unit and earns C in period 1. Following this, at the beginning of period 2,
there are 3 possible states:
• State 1: Exactly one customer arrives. Probability of this event is (p + q − 2p q).
The downstream ﬁrm sells and restarts period 0 strategy. Thus upstream payoﬀ is
UW0 .
• State 2: 2 customers (1 old and 1 new) arrive. Probability of this event is p q.
The downstream ﬁrm sells to the returning customer and restarts production. Thus
upstream ﬁrm is in exactly the same situation as at the start of period 1 if a customer
arrives. Thus upstream payoﬀ is U1(1).
• State 3: No customer arrives. Probability of this event is (1 − p)(1 − q). Let the
payoﬀ in this state be denoted by U2(0). This is derived as follows. If a customer
arrives tomorrow, the downstream ﬁrms sells the unit previously produced, and
restarts period 0 strategy. The upstream payoﬀ is UW0 . If no one arrives tomorrow,
the upstream ﬁrm gets U2(0). Thus
U2(0) = 0 + δ
(
p UW0 + (1− p) U2(0)
)
. (A.7)
From the above,
U1(1) = C + δ
[
(p + q − 2p q)UW0 + p qU1(1) + (1− p)(1− q)U2(0)
]
(A.8)
From equations (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8), we can solve for UW0 , and obtain:
UW0 =
(1− δ(1− p)) δ p C
(1− δ)(1− δ + δ p (2− q))
=
δ p
(1− δ) + δ p (2− q)U
I
0 ,
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where the second step uses equation (3.5).‖
A.5 Proof of proposition 4
From (A.4), V W0  0 as p  pD , where pD is given by equation (3.3). Thus for p < pD , τ ∗
is given by V I0 + τ
∗C = 0, and for p ∈ [pD , pDic ), τ ∗ is given by V I0 + τ ∗C = V W0 , where pDic
is given by equation (3.4). Finally, from equations (3.1) and (3.2), V I0 ≥ V W0 if p ≥ pDic .
Thus for p ≥ pDic , τ ∗ = 0. Thus,
τ ∗ =
1
C
(
max{0, V W0 , V I0 } − V I0
)
,
which is as given.
Let us check that τ ∗ ∈ (0, 1) in all cases. For p ≥ pDic , τ ∗ = 0. For p < pD , V I0 < V W0 < 0.
Thus τ ∗ = −V I0 /C > 0. Also, from (3.1), −V I0 < C. Thus τ ∗ < 1.
Next, for p ∈ [pD , pDic ), V W0 > 0 and V W0 > V I0 . Thus τ ∗ = (V W0 −V I0 )/C > 0. Also, from
equations (3.1) and (3.2), for p ∈ [pD , pDic ),
V W0 − V I0
C
= 1− δ p
1− δ
δ p (1− q) (P − C) + (1− δ)(1− δ q (1− p))P
1− δ + δ p (2− q) < 1 (A.9)
Thus τ ∗ < 1.
Next, let us check that τ ∗ satisﬁes all the participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints. From equation (4.4) it is clear that by construction the payoﬀ under τ ∗ satisﬁes
the downstream incentive constraint (4.2). We ﬁnally check the upstream participation
constraint (4.3).
The upstream payoﬀ under optimal trade credit, UT
∗
0 , is given by U
I
0 − τ ∗C.
For p ∈ (0, pD ), τ ∗ = −V I0 /C. Thus
UW0
UT
∗
0
=
UW0
U I0 − τ ∗C
=
UW0
U I0 + V
I
0
=
(1− δ + δ p)
(1− δ + δ p(2− q))
C
P
< 1.
Next, for p ∈ [pD , pDic ), τ ∗ = (V W0 − V I0 )/C. Thus
UW0
UT
∗
0
=
UW0
U I0 − (V W0 − V I0 )
<
UW0
U I0 − C
=
(1− δ + δ p)
(1− δ + δ p(2− q)) < 1,
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where the second step follows from the fact that from (A.9), (V W0 − V I0 ) < C. The
two inequalities above show that the upstream payoﬀ under τ ∗ satisﬁes the upstream
participation constraint (4.3).
For p ≥ pDic the immediate production strategy is chosen optimally even without trade
credit. The optimal trade credit satisﬁes feasibility, and ensures that the downstream ﬁrm
invests and follows the immediate production strategy for p < pDic . Thus optimal trade
credit restores ﬁrst best.‖
A.6 Proof of proposition 5
If the downstream ﬁrm produces immediately after each sale, in each period it either
carries 1 unit or produces 1 unit. Thus the average inventory per period is simply 1.
Now let us calculate the average inventory under the wait-and-see strategy. Let M0 denote
the total value of inventories starting period 0 under this strategy. Let M1(1) denote the
value of inventories starting period 1 if a customer arrives at the start of period 1. Note
that if no customer arrives at the start of period 1, the situation is exactly like the start
of period 0. Thus
M0 = 0 + δ
(
pM1(1) + (1− p)M0
)
. (A.10)
If a customer arrives at the start of period 1, then a unit is produced in period 1 (inventory
value is P in period 1). Then there are three possibilities at the start of period 2. (i) No
customer arrives (probability (1− p)(1− q)), in which case denote the value from period
2 onwards by M2(0). (ii) Exactly one customer arrives (probability p+ q− 2pq), in which
case the unit is sold and subsequently the situation is exactly like the start of period 0,
and the value is given by M0. (iii) Two customers arrive (probability pq), in which case
the unit is sold to the returning customer, but since there is one new customer who is not
served, the subsequent value is given by M1(1). Therefore,
M1(1) = P + δ
(
(1− p) (1− q)M2(0) + (p + q − 2p q)M0 + p q M1(1)
)
. (A.11)
Finally, M2(0) can be calculated as follows:
M2(0) = P + δ
(
pM0 + (1− p)M2(0)
)
. (A.12)
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Now, let the average inventory level under the wait-and-see strategy be denoted by I
W
.
Then we can also write M0 as
M0 =
I
W
P
1− δ .
Solving for M0 from equations (A.10)-(A.12), and using the above to solve for I
W
, we get
the required expression for I
W
.
A.7 Proof of lemma 3
UUI0 is the same as Û
I
0 given by (5.1) (and explained in footnote 9):
UUI0 = (C −G) + δ p (C −G) + δ2 p (C −G) + . . . = (C −G) +
δ p (C −G)
1− δ (A.13)
Next, let us calculate UUW0 . The upstream ﬁrm produces once the downstream ﬁrm has
sold an unit. This guarantees that as soon as the upstream ﬁrm produces a unit of input,
it is immediately sold.
In period 0, the downstream ﬁrm spends C and starts production. Thus the upstream
ﬁrm earns C in period 0. In period 1 there are two possible states - either a customer
arrives or no customer arrives. Let U1(0) be the value from period 1 onwards in the
second state. If a customer arrives, then the downstream ﬁrm makes a sale, and thus the
upstream ﬁrm produces in period 1. Thus the payoﬀ in period 1 is −G, and let the value
from period 2 onwards be denoted by U2(1). Thus:
UUW0 = C + δ (p (−G + δU2(1)) + (1− p)U1(0).) (A.14)
Now, U1(0) can be calculated easily as follows:
U1(0) = 0 + δp (−G + δU2(1)) + δ(1− p)U1(0). (A.15)
Let us now calculate U2(1). Since the upstream ﬁrm produces in period 1, it sells a unit
at the start of period 2, and then waits to see if a sale occurs at the start of period 3. If a
sale does occur, it is in the same situation as at the start of period 1 if a customer arrives.
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If no sale occurs, it is in the same situation as at the start of period 1 if no customer
arrives. Thus
U2(1) = C + (prob customer arrives at start of period 3) δ (−G + δ U2(1))
+ (prob no customer arrives at start of period 3) δ U1(0).
Now, since the upstream ﬁrm produces in period 1, the downstream ﬁrm can only produce
in period 2. Any customer arriving at the start of period 2 cannot be served.
In period 3, no customer arrives if there is neither any returning customer from period 2,
nor any new customer arrives in period 3. The probability of this event is11 (1−p)(1−p q).
At least one customer arrives with probability 1− (1− p)(1− p q). Thus
U2(1) = C + δ (1− (1− p) (1− p q)) (−G + δ U2(1)) + δ (1− p) (1− p q)U1(0). (A.16)
Solving from equations (A.14)-(A.16), we get the required expression for UUW0 .‖
A.8 Proof of proposition 6
Let ∆U ≡ UUW0 − UUI0 . Now, let pUic be such that for p = pUic, ∆U = 0. Using equa-
tions (A.13) and (7.2), we have
lim
p→1
∆U = −δC −G
1− δ2 < 0,
where the second step follows from the fact that from assumption 2, δ C > G. Further,
limp→0 ∆U = G > 0. The two limits show that a solution pUic exists and that 0 < p
U
ic < 1.‖
A.9 Proof of lemma 4
In period 0, the downstream ﬁrm spends C and starts production. In period 1 there are
two possible states - either a customer arrives or no customer arrives. Let Y1 be the value
11The probability that there is a returning customer is the probability that a customer arrives (p)
times the probability that he returns (q). Thus the probability of no returning customer is (1− p q). The
probability of no new customer arriving in period 3 is (1− p).
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in the ﬁrst state and Y0 be the value in the second state. Then
V UW0 = − C + δ p Y1 + δ (1− p) Y0. (A.17)
Now, Y0 can be calculated easily as follows: Y0 = 0 + δ (p Y1 + (1− p) Y0). Thus,
Y0 =
δ p
1− δ (1− p)Y1. (A.18)
Let us now calculate Y1. In period 1, if a customer arrives, the downstream ﬁrm sells
the output produced in period 0, and gets P . Following a sale, the downstream ﬁrm
places an order for an unit of input. Since the upstream ﬁrm did not produce in period
0, but delays production for a period to period 1, the downstream ﬁrm does not have the
required input and cannot produce in period 1. Thus if a customer arrives in period 1,
the downstream ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is simply P today. In period 2, the downstream ﬁrm spends
C and produces an unit of output. Any customer arriving in this period does not get
served, but might return next period. At the start of period 3, the downstream ﬁrm has
1 unit of output to sell.
In period 3, no customer arrives if there is neither any returning customer from period 2,
nor any new customer arrives in period 3. The probability of this event is12 (1−p)(1−p q).
In this case the situation is exactly like the state in period 1 in which no customer arrives,
and the payoﬀ is Y0. At least one customer arrives with probability 1− (1− p)(1− p q),
and in this case the situation is exactly like the state in period 1 in which a customer
arrives. The reason is that even if 2 customers arrive in period 3, since the downstream
ﬁrm can only sell the next unit of output in period 5 (because of the delay in production
by the upstream sector), any customer who does not get served at the start of period 3 is
lost completely. Thus there is no diﬀerence between 1 customer arriving in period 3 and
2 customers arriving. Thus if at least one customer arrives at the start of period 3, the
subsequent payoﬀ is Y1.
From the above, we can write Y1 = P−δ C+δ2 ((1− (1− p)(1− p q)) Y1 + (1− p)(1− p q) Y0).
12The probability that there is a returning customer is the probability that a customer arrives (p)
times the probability that he returns (q). Thus the probability of no returning customer is (1− p q). The
probability of no new customer arriving in period 3 is (1− p).
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Using the value of Y0 from equation (A.18) and solving, we get
Y1 =
(1− δ (1− p)) (P − δ C)
(1− δ) (1 + δ p (1− δ q (1− p))) (A.19)
Solving from equations (A.17), (A.18), and (A.19), we obtain the stated expression for
V UW0 . This completes the proof of the lemma.‖
A.10 Proof of proposition 7
We know that V UI0 is equal to V
I
0 given by equation (3.1). Using this and the value of
V UW0 from equation (7.3), V
UI
0 = V
UW
0 at p = p c where
p c =
1− δ q
2δ q
(√
1 +
4q (1− δ)
(1− δ q)2
C
(P − C) − 1
)
.
Further, for p > p c, V
UI
0 > V
UW
0 .
From proposition 2, for p ≥ pDic , the downstream ﬁrm prefers immediate production - i.e.
V I0 > V
W
0 for p > p
D
ic , where p
D
ic is given by (3.4). Using the value of p c from above, and
the value of pDic , it is easy (but laborious) to see that
(pDic )
2 − (p c)2 =
(
2 q (1− δ)C
(1− δ q) ((P − C)− q (δ P − C))
)2 (
q (δ P − C)
(P − C)
)
> 0,
where the last step follows from the fact that δ P > C. Since pDic and p c are both positive,
the above shows that pDic > p c. It follows that for p > p
D
ic , V
UI
0 > V
UW
0 . This completes
the proof of proposition 7.‖
A.11 Proof of proposition 9
Since UUI0 + θ
∗C = UUW0 , θ
∗ > 0 whenever UUW0 > U
UI
0 . From proposition 6, this is the
case for p < pUic.
The proof proceeds through the following lemma.
Lemma 5 V UI0 − V UW0 is strictly increasing in p.
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Proof: Since V UI0 = V
I
0 , using the values from equations (3.1) and (7.3), and simplifying,
we get
V UI0 − V UW0 =
δ p
1− δ
[
(P − C)
1 + (1/f(p))
− C(1− δ)
1 + f(p)
,
]
(A.20)
where f(p) = p δ (1 − δ q) + p2 δ2 q. Note that f ′(p) > 0. Thus the ﬁrst term inside the
square brackets on the right hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing in p,
and the second term is strictly decreasing in p. Thus the term inside the square bracket
is strictly increasing in p. The coeﬃcient of this term is also strictly increasing in p. This
proves the result.‖
From proposition 7, V UI0 −V UW0 > 0 for p > pDic . The lemma above shows that V UI0 −V UW0
increases in p. Therefore if pDpp is such that at p = p
D
pp, V
UI
0 − V UW0 = θ∗C > 0, then it
must be that pDpp ≥ pDic .
Next, as p → 1, V UI0 −θ∗C−V UW0 →
δ2P −G
1− δ2 . From assumption 2, δP > C and δC > G.
Therefore δ2P > G. Thus for p close to 1, the downstream participation constraint, given
by equation (7.5) holds with strict inequality. Thus pDpp < 1.
Finally, positive prepayment is needed only for p < pUic. Thus prepayment restores eﬃ-
ciency on the interval [pDpp, p
U
ic] whenever p
D
pp < p
U
ic.‖
A.12 Proof of proposition 10
1. Trade credit is relevant for p < pDic . From equation (3.4), it is straightforward to
verify that
∂pDic
∂P
< 0,
∂pDic
∂C
> 0, and
∂pDic
∂q
> 0.
Thus pDic is decreasing in (P − C) and increasing in q. Finally,
∂pDic
∂δ
=
(
C
δ2B2
)(
δ(1− δ)qP − B)
where B = (P − C) − q(δP − C) > 0. Now, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side
above is always positive. Let J(δ) denote the second term. It can be easily checked
that J(C/P ) = −(P − C)(1 − qC/P ) < 0 and J(1) = −(P − C)(1 − q) < 0. Further,
J ′(·) = 2qP (1−δ) > 0. Suppose the second term is positive at some δ. But then J ′(·) has
41
to be negative at some point since the term is negative at δ = 1. This contradicts the fact
that J ′(·) > 0. Therefore the second term is always negative, implying that ∂p
D
ic
∂δ
< 0.
Further, as δ goes to its lower limit, C/P , pDic → 1, making the scope for trade credit full.
Next, the upstream participation-in-trade-credit constraint is given by 5.2, which can be
expanded as
(C −G)(1− δ + δp)(1− δ + δp(1− q))
(1− δ)(1− δ + δp(2− q) ≥ τ
∗C
where τ ∗ is given by equation (4.5). Now, the left hand side is decreasing in G and the
right hand side does not depend on G. Further, from proposition 4, we know that if
G = 0, the upstream participation-in-trade-credit constraint does not bind. Therefore,
for any P,C, q and any δ satisfying assumption 2, and for any p < pDic , there exists Gc
such that for G < Gc the constraint is satisﬁed.
2. Next, let us consider the eﬀect on the scope of prepayment of the upstream markup
(C −G), q and δ.
Let ∆U ≡ UUW0 − UUI0 . Also let Z ≡ (1 + δ p (1− δ q (1− p))).
Using equations (A.13) and (7.2),
∂∆U
∂C
= − δ p
(1− δ)
1− δ(1− δ p q) + δ p (1− δ q)
Z
< 0.
∂∆U
∂G
= 1 +
δ2 p2
(1− δ)
(1− δ q (1− p))
Z
> 0.
∂∆U
∂q
=
δ
(1− δ)
(
δ2 p2 (1− p) (δC −G)
Z2
)
> 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that from assumption 2, δ C > G. Finally,
∂∆U
∂p
= − δ
(1− δ)
(
(δC −G)(1− δ2 p2 q)
Z2
+ (C −G)
)
< 0.
Now pUic is given by ∆U = 0. Thus
∂pUic
∂C
= − ∂∆U/∂C
∂∆U/∂p
< 0, and
∂pUic
∂G
= − ∂∆U/∂G
∂∆U/∂p
> 0.
From the two inequalities above it follows that pUic is decreasing in (C −G). Further,
∂pUic
∂q
= − ∂∆U/∂q
∂∆U/∂p
> 0.
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Finally, as δ falls (i.e. r rises), waiting becomes more attractive relative to immediate
production, so that ∆U rises. Thus
∂pUic
∂δ
= − ∂∆U/∂δ
∂∆U/∂p
< 0. Further, it can be
easily checked that as δ → G/C, pUic → 1, implying the maximum possible scope for
prepayment.
Next, as P increases, the downstream ﬁrm has more to lose from lost sales, thus if the
upstream ﬁrm decides to wait, the downstream ﬁrm’s incentive to participate in prepay-
ment increases with P . Formally, the downstream sector participates in prepayment if
(7.5) holds. From proposition 9, this holds for p ≥ pDpp. Thus pDpp is given by
V UI0 − V UW0 = θ∗C.
From equation (A.20) it is straightforward to verify that V UI0 − V UW0 increases in P . On
the other hand, it is easy to see from equation (7.4) that θ∗C is independent of P .
From lemma 5 in section A.11, the left hand side is increasing in p. Also , it can be easily
veriﬁed from equation (7.4), that θ∗C is decreasing in p.
Let X = V UI0 − V UW0 − θ∗C. We have just established that
∂X
∂P
> 0 and,
∂X
∂p
> 0.
Thus
∂pDpp
∂P
= − ∂X/∂P
∂X/∂p
< 0. As P rises, for any given C,G, q and any δ satisfying
assumption 2, pDpp becomes smaller and smaller. Therefore, for any given C,G, q and any
δ satisfying assumption 2, and for any p˜ < pUic, there exists Pc such that for P > Pc, p
D
pp is
lower than p˜ so that the participation-in-prepayment constraint of the downstream ﬁrm
holds at p˜. This completes the proof.‖
43
References
Blazenko, George W. and Kirk Vandezande, “Corporate Holdings of Finished
Goods Inventories,” Journal of Economics and Business, 2003, 55, 255–266. 20
Blinder, Alan S. and Louis J. Maccini, “Taking Stock: A Critical Assessment of
Recent Research on Inventories,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5, 73–96. 1,
4, 6, 19, 30
Brechling, Frank P.R. and Richard G. Lipsey, “Trade Credit and Monetary Policy,”
Economic Journal, 1963, 73, 618–641. 1
Brennan, Michael J., Vojislav Maksimovic, and Josef Zechner, “Vendor Financ-
ing,” Journal of Finance, 1988, 43(5), 1127–1141. 2, 5
Burkart, Mike and Tore Ellingsen, “In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit,”
American Economic Review, 2004, 94(3), 569–590. 1, 2, 5, 20
Dynan, Karen E., Kathleeen W. Johnson, and Samuel Slowinski, “Survey of
Finance Companies 2000,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 2002. 18
Emery, Gary W., “An Optimal Financial Response to Variable Demand,” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1987, 22(2), 209–225. 6
Ferris, J. Stephen, “A Transactions Theory of Trade Credit Use,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1981, 94(2), 243–270. 2, 5
Kahn, James A., “Why is Production More Volatile than Sales? Theory and Evi-
dence on the Stockout Avoidance Motive for Inventory Holding,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1992. 6
Maccini, Louis J., Bartholomew Moore, and Huntley Schaller, “The Interest
Rate, Learning, and Inventory Investment,” American Economic Review, 2004, forth-
coming. 4, 19
Marvel, Howard P. and James Peck, “Demand Uncertainty and Returns Policies,”
International Economic Review, 1995. 18
44
Meltzer, Allan H., “Mercantile Credit, Monetary Policy, and Size of Firms,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 1960, 42(4), 429–437. 1
Nadiri, Ishaq M., “The Determinants of Trade Credit in the U.S. Total Manufacturing
Sector,” Econometrica, 1969, 37(3), 408–423. 5
Ng, Chee K., Janet Kiholm Smith, and Richard L. Smith, “Evidence on the
Determinants of Credit Terms in Interﬁrm Trade,” Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(3),
1109–1129. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 20, 29
Nilsen, Jeﬀrey H., “Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 2002, 34(1), 226–253. 1, 22
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan, “Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence,”
Review of Financial Studies, 1997, 10(3), 661–691. 17, 20
Schwartz, Robert A. and David K. Whitcomb, “The Trade Credit Decision,”
in James L. Bicksler, ed., Handbook of Financial Economics, North-Holland, 1979,
pp. 257–273. 5
Vandenberg, Paul, “Adapting to the Financial Landscape: Evidence from Small Firms
in Nairobi,” World Development, 2003, 31(11), 1829–1843. 29
45
